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Discussion Paper 10-12 A model for determining whether a ﬁrm should exercise
multiple real options individually or simultaneously∗
Michi NISHIHARA†
Abstract
We develop a model for determining whether a ﬁrm should exercise two real options
individually or simultaneously. The simultaneous exercise of both options has positive
synergy, such as economies of scale, scope, and networks, while separate exercise of each
option beneﬁts from project ﬂexibility. This tradeoﬀ determines the optimal exercise
policy. We investigate the static and dynamic management of multiple real options. A ﬁrm
under static management determines the type of exercise of real options ex ante; on the
other hand, a ﬁrm under dynamic management makes the decision at the time of exercise.
The analysis reveals the gap between the two styles of managing. Most importantly, we
highlight the advantage of dynamic management over static management, particularly
for weakly correlated markets. We also explain empirical implications regarding a ﬁrm’s
entry into several countries and regions in Asia.
JEL Classiﬁcations Code: C61, G13, G31.
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The global ﬁnancial crisis which began in 2007 has increased uncertainty about the future
market demand in many industries throughout the world. It has become increasingly
important for project managers to take into account both uncertainty and ﬂexibility in
the future. The real options approach, in which option pricing theory is applied to capital
budgeting decisions, better enables us to ﬁnd an optimal investment strategy and under-
take project valuation in this environment than is possible under more classical methods.
The early literature has investigated a real option that has a rather simple payoﬀ
structure, assuming that dynamics of project value follow a one-dimensional stochastic
process (e.g., (Dixit and Pindyck 1994)). Naturally, the studies have been developed
into a more complicated real options analysis on the basis of a multidimensional process
(e.g., (Geltner, et al 1996, Louberg´ e, et al 2002, Cortazar, et al 2008, Martzoukos 2009,
Nishihara 2010)).1 For example, (Geltner, et al 1996) investigates land development
timing with an alternative land use choice, while (Louberg´ e, et al 2002) investigates
timing in switching methods of nuclear waste disposal. These multidimensional models
focus primarily on the nature of a single real option that has a complex payoﬀ structure
individually.
However, a ﬁrm typically possesses a collection of real options at the same time. Be-
cause exercising multiple real options, unlike ﬁnancial options, has the potential to yield
synergy, such as economies of scales, scopes, and networks, a ﬁrm faces the problem of
whether to exercise multiple options individually or simultaneously. To our knowledge,
this paper is the ﬁrst work that attempts to capture the nature of this problem.2 Several
papers (e.g., (Meier, et al 2001, Luehrman 2004, Wang and Hwang 2007)) investigate
the management of a portfolio of multiple real options in the context of project portfo-
lio choice. For example, (Meier, et al 2001) proposes both static and dynamic zero-one
optimization models for a portfolio of real options, and (Luehrman 2004) presents a con-
ceptual framework for strategic management of real options. However, there is a large gap
between these studies and the real options literature on the basis of a multidimensional
stochastic process. Indeed, these papers tend to be positioned in the context of portfolio
optimization rather than in the context of real options. This paper ﬁlls the gap by investi-
gating the problem of how to manage multiple real options in terms of a multidimensional
1Another stream of real options development is combined with game theory. Strategic interactions among
several ﬁrms are investigated in (Grenadier 1996, Grenadier 2002, Lambrecht and Perraudin 2003, Nishihara and
Fukushima 2008), while agency problems in a single ﬁrm are investigated in (Mauer and Sarkar 2005, Grenadier
and Wang 2005, Shibata and Nishihara 2010).
2Although (Trigeorgis 1993) investigates the nonadditivity of the value of multiple real options, he does not
consider the problem of whether multiple real options are exercised individually or simultaneously. In addition,
the analysis is based on a one-dimensional process.
1stochastic model.
Our model assumes that a ﬁrm has two business opportunities in which it may invest.
A ﬁrm is able to decide whether two projects are to be carried on individually or simul-
taneously. Investing in each project individually yields project ﬂexibility, while initiating
both projects simultaneously yields positive synergy, including economies of scale, scope,
networks, etc. Taking account of this tradeoﬀ, a ﬁrm determines the optimal type of
investment.
This paper distinguishes two styles of management. One is static management. A
ﬁrm under static management determines whether it exercises options individually or
simultaneously ex ante. This style is likely to apply to a ﬁrm which takes a top-down
approach to the management decision. The managerial ﬂexibility also depends on the
type of project. A project which requires advance preparation contingent on the type of
investment forces a ﬁrm to make the management decision ex ante. Static management
is related to the static optimization approach to a project portfolio choice.
The second style is dynamic management. A ﬁrm under dynamic management is
capable of deciding whether it invests in projects individually or simultaneously at the
time of investment. In comparison to static management, this style is likely to apply
to a ﬁrm in which the management decision can be made ﬂexibly and with a bottom-up
approach. It is presumed for dynamic management that a project does not require advance
preparation depending on the type of investment. Dynamic management is closely related
to the dynamic optimization approach to the evaluation of an option on multiple assets.
In the model, we reveal the nature of static and dynamic management as well as the
gap arising between the two. Our results regarding the exercise region of multiple options
under dynamic management can be positioned as an extension of the previous ﬁndings by
(Geltner, et al 1996, Broadie and Detemple 1997, Detemple 2006, Nishihara 2010). In the
comparative statics, we focus on the eﬀects of a correlation among the project values. We
demonstrate that a lower correlation among the values gives a ﬁrm the incentive to invest
individually rather than simultaneously. This ﬁnding is contrasted with (Childs, Ott, and
Triantis 1998), which shows that a higher correlation increases the value of sequential
development rather than parallel development.3 The diﬀerence results from the model
assumptions. They focus on the mutually exclusive case in which a ﬁrm invests in the
development stage of two projects and then may select only a single project to implement.
In contrast, we investigate the inclusive case in which a ﬁrm can receive proﬁts from both
projects. Further, and more importantly, we ﬁnd that a weaker correlation increases the
advantage of dynamic management over static management. This is principally because a
weaker correlation increases the possibility that an ex ante choice of the investment type
turns out suboptimal ex post.
3Their analysis is restricted within static management.
2The model applies to the strategic decision concerning market entry into several coun-
tries and regions. Below, we focus on a situation in which a ﬁrm expands business into
several countries and regions in Asia. Recently, an increasing number of corporations are
driven by the need to expand business to Asia’s markets, primarily because Asia’s rapidly
growing population will potentially generate the largest markets in the world. For in-
stance, UNIQLO, the Japanese casual wear brand which has already launched operations
in China in 2002, Hong Kong and South Korea in 2005, and Singapore in 2009, announced
its plans to enter markets in Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia within a couple of years.
In expanding business into Asia, a ﬁrm must take careful consideration of the di-
versity which is characteristic of Asia. Even within the same country, the dynamics of
the economy vary across regions. In addition to the economies, there are a wide variety
of languages, ethnicities, cultural and religious prescriptions, and business practices in
Asia. Naturally, a ﬁrm entering Asia’s markets faces many risks that diﬀer among coun-
tries and regions. For example, Indonesia has a risk of political instability, while China’s
information control greatly aﬀects Internet businesses.
The paper demonstrates that the heterogeneity of market risk in Asia increases the
incentive for a ﬁrm to enter each market individually, depending on country-speciﬁc and
region-speciﬁc risks, rather than a simultaneous entry into the whole market. This ar-
gument supports the overseas expansion strategies of many ﬁrms, including UNIQLO.
Further, and more importantly, we highlight the advantage of dynamic corporate man-
agement over static management for weakly correlated markets. In our view, the dynamic
management capability will be a major success determinant for a business in Asia.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the properties of the option
value and the exercise policy under static management. Then, Section 3 presents those of
dynamic management and reveals a gap between the two styles. Section 4 shows further




Consider a ﬁrm that plans two projects (denoted by projects i = 1 and 2) in which to
invest. The risk-adjusted values of the projects, X(t) = (X1(t),X2(t)), are random and
follow a bidimensional time-homogeneous diﬀusion process
dXi(t) = µi(Xi(t))dt + σi(Xi(t))dBi(t), (1)
where (B1(t),B2(t)) is a bidimensional Brownian Motion (BM) with correlation coeﬃcient
ρ satisfying |ρ| < 1. Coeﬃcients µi(Xi(t)) and σi(Xi(t))(> 0) denote the risk-adjusted
3growth rate and volatility of the project value, respectively. The ﬁrm chooses between
individual and simultaneous investment. Investing in project i individually requires an
irreversible capital expenditure of Ii(> 0), while simultaneous investment in both projects
requires an irreversible capital expenditure of I1,2(> 0). Assume that max(I1,I2) <
I1,2 < I1+I2. This assumption means that simultaneous investment has positive synergy,
including economies of scale, scope, networks, etc. Mathematically, the model is built
on the ﬁltered probability space (Ω,F,P;Ft) generated by (B1(t),B2(t)). The set Ft
represents the set of available information in time t, and the ﬁrm ﬁnds the optimal policy
under this information. The ﬁrm’s real options are perpetual. The risk-free rate is a
constant r(> 0).
2.2 Valuation of each option
To begin, we evaluate the option to invest in a single project i individually. For Xi(0) = xi,




Exi[e¡rτ(Xi(τ) − Ii)], (2)
where T denotes the set of all stopping times τ and Exi[·] is the expectation conditional on
Xi(0) = xi. Note that (2) corresponds to a perpetual American call option. Under some
plausible assumptions (for details, see (Peskir and Shiryaev 2006)) the optimal stopping
time τi for problem (2) becomes τi = inf{t ≥ 0 | X(t) ∈ Si}, where the stopping region Si
is deﬁned by
Si = {x ∈ R2 | Vi(xi) = xi − Ii}. (3)
The optimal policy is that a ﬁrm makes investment in project i as soon as X(t) hits Si.
Next, consider simultaneous investment in both projects. For X(0) = x = (x1,x2),




Ex[e¡rτ(X1(τ) + X2(τ) − I1,2)]. (4)
Note that (4) corresponds to a perpetual American basket option. Under some plausible
assumptions, the optimal stopping time τ1,2 for problem (4) can be expressed as τ1,2 =
inf{t ≥ 0 | X(t) ∈ S1,2}, where the stopping region S1,2 is deﬁned by
S1,2 = {x ∈ R2 | V1,2(x) = x1 + x2 − I1,2}. (5)
The optimal policy is that a ﬁrm makes simultaneous investment in projects 1 and 2 as
soon as X(t) hits S1,2.
In general, the value functions Vi(xi), V1,2(x) and the stopping regions Si, S1,2 cannot
be derived in any closed form. It is well known that, for X(t) following either a geometric
4Brownian motion (GBM) or a Brownian motion (BM) with a drift, Vi(xi) and Si can
be derived in closed forms (see (Dixit and Pindyck 1994)). First, consider the case of a
GBM. Assume that µi(Xi(t)) = µiXi(t),σi(Xi(t)) = σiXi(t),µi < r and Xi(0) = xi > 0
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The option value V1,2(x) and the stopping region S1,2 can not be derived in any closed
forms, because the sum of GBMs, X1(t) + X2(t), does not follow a GBM. Instead, the
following properties are well known (e.g., (Broadie and Detemple 1997, Detemple 2006)):
(Convexity of the value function) V1,2(x) is a convex function.
(Convexity of the stopping region) S1,2 is a convex set.
(Monotonicity of the stopping region) x ∈ S1,2 ⇒ x0 ∈ S1,2 (∀x0
1 ≥ x1,∀x0
2 ≥ x2).
Next, suppose that X(t) follows a BM with a drift. Assume that µi(Xi(t)) = µi,σi(Xi(t)) =
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(9)
and the stopping region
Si = {x ∈ R2 | xi ≥ x¤¤
i }, (10)
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The option value V1,2(x) and the stopping region S1,2 can also be derived in closed forms,
because the sum of BMs, Y (t) = X1(t) + X2(t), follows




2 + 2ρσ1σ2dBY (t), (12)



























1,2 − I1,2) (x1 + x2 < x¤¤
1,2)
x1 + x2 − I1,2 (x1 + x2 ≥ x¤¤
1,2)
(14)
and the stopping region
S1,2 = {x ∈ R2 | x1 + x2 ≥ x¤¤
1,2}, (15)
where the investment threshold x¤¤
1,2 is deﬁned by
x¤¤




The following proposition shows the comparative statics with respect to the correlation
coeﬃcient ρ.
Proposition 1 Assume that X(t) follows a BM with a drift.
(Monotonicity of the value function) V1,2(x) monotonically increases with ρ.
(Monotonicity of the stopping region) S1,2 monotonically decreases with ρ.





















Proposition 1 can be interpreted as follows. The sum of two project values shows a
higher volatility as the correlation between two projects increases. An increase in volatil-
ity enhances the option value, as well as the investment threshold. The properties of
Proposition 1 tend to hold for a more general diﬀusion X(t), though it is hard to prove
the properties mathematically. We will check the properties numerically for a GBM in
Section 4.
2.3 Static management of real options
This section considers static management. A ﬁrm under static management decides
whether the projects are launched individually or simultaneously ex ante. For X(0) = x,
ﬁrm value under static management is evaluated by







6The value V1(x1) + V2(x2) corresponds to the value of individual investment, while the
value V1,2(x) corresponds to the value of simultaneous investment. When X(0) = x lies
in
S1,2,M = {x ∈ R2 | V1,2(x) ≥ V1(x1) + V2(x2)}, (18)
a ﬁrm chooses simultaneous investment ex ante and initiates both projects at the time τ1,2
Otherwise, it chooses individual investment ex ante and executes project i individually at
the time τi. A favorable characteristic of static management is its simplicity, though the
value is lower than that of dynamic management. Indeed, we can derive the value and
the optimal exercise policy in the manner described in Section 2.2. It should be noted
that the static management approach resembles project portfolio selection models. For
example, the option value maximization method in (Meier, et al 2001) aims to maximize
statically a value of a portfolio of real options.
Let us explore the nature of static management. As will be seen numerically in Section
4, S1,2,M dose not satisfy either monotonicity or convexity. Instead, we can show that
S1∩S2 ⊂ S1,2,M. Indeed, for any x ∈ S1∩S2, we have V1(x1)+V2(x2) = x1−I1+x2−I2 <
x1 + x2 − I1,2 ≤ V1,2(x). We can also derive the boundary of S1,2,M for a suﬃciently
large xi. For simplicity, assume that X(t) follows either a GBM or a BM with a drift.
For a suﬃciently large xi, we have V1(x1) + V2(x2) = xi − Ii + Vj(xj) (j  = i) and
V1,2(x) = x1 + x2 − I1,2 because x lies in Si ∩ S1,2. There exists a unique solution ˆ xj <
x¤
j (or x¤¤
j ) to Vj(xj) = xj − I1,2 + Ii because of 0 < I1,2 − Ii < Ij. Then, the boundary
of S1,2,M coincides with a line xj = ˆ xj. In the region xj ≥ ˆ xj a ﬁrm chooses simultaneous
investment, while in the region xj < ˆ xj it chooses individual investment. By proposition
1, we can show the comparative statics with respect to the correlation coeﬃcient ρ.
Proposition 2 Assume that X(t) follows a BM with a drift.
(Monotonicity of the value function) VM(x) monotonically increases with ρ.
(Monotonicity of the simultaneous investment region) S1,2,M monotonically in-
creases with ρ.
Proof By proposition 1, we have ∂V1,2(x)/∂ρ ≥ 0. Then, by (17) we have the mono-
tonicity of VM(x) with respect to ρ. Because V1(x1)+V2(x2) is independent of ρ, we also
have the monotonicity of S1,2,M with respect to ρ. ¤
Proposition 2 leads to the straightforward result that a ﬁrm is more likely to make
simultaneous investment in strongly correlated markets. This result can account for the
overseas expansion strategies of many ﬁrms entering several countries and regions in Asia.
A ﬁne example is UNIQLO, the Japanese casual wear brand. UNIQLO has been operating
in China since 2002, but has not yet planned to enter India. On the other hand, it has
planned to enter Indonesia and Malaysia almost simultaneously. This is because Indonesia
and Malaysia have much in common, while China and India have few similarities.
7More generally, there are a wide variety of risks that diﬀer among countries and re-
gions in Asia. Therefore, it is commonly believed that a ﬁrm should market diﬀerent
products which meet country-speciﬁc and region-speciﬁc demands. We complement the
conventional argument in terms of the timing of market entry. Diversity, which is a major
characteristic in Asia, provides the incentive for a ﬁrm to enter each market separately.
Note that the properties of Proposition 2, like Proposition 1, tend to hold for a more
general diﬀusion X(t). Relevantly, (Childs, Ott, and Triantis 1998) investigates a model
where a ﬁrm invests in the development stage of two projects and then may select only a
single project to implement. The model compares the values of developing the projects in
sequence or in parallel. Because of the assumption of mutual exclusion, their result is in
opposition to ours. In their analysis, a ﬁrm chooses sequential development rather than
parallel development, when projects have highly correlated values.
3 Dynamic management
3.1 Dynamic management of real options
This section considers dynamic management. A ﬁrm under dynamic management is capa-
ble of determining whether it initiates projects individually or simultaneously at the time
of investment. In comparison to static management, a ﬁrm requires managerial ﬂexibility.
For X(0) = x, ﬁrm value under dynamic management is evaluated by
VD(x) = sup
τ2T
Ex[e¡rτ max{V1(X1(τ)) + V2(X2(τ))
| {z }
option to invest individually
, V1,2(X(τ))
| {z }











Ex[e¡rτ max{X1(τ) + V2(X2(τ)) − I1 | {z }
individual investment in 1
,X2(τ) + V1(X1(τ)) − I2 | {z }
individual investment in 2
,




In (20), Xi(τ)+Vj(Xj(τ))−Ii (i  = j) is composed of the value of individual investment in
project i at the time τ, Xi(τ)−Ii, and the value of the option to invest in project j( = i)
individually, Vj(Xj(τ)). In (20), X1(τ)+X2(τ)−I1,2 represents the value of simultaneous
investment in both projects at the time τ. Under some plausible assumptions, the optimal
stopping time τD for problem (20) can be expressed as τD = inf{t ≥ 0 | X(t) ∈ S1,D ∪
S2,D ∪ S1,2,D}, where the stopping region Si,D are deﬁned by
Si,D = {x ∈ R2 | VD(x) = xi + Vj(xj) − Ii} (j  = i)
8for i = 1,2, and the stopping region S1,2,D is deﬁned by
S1,2,D = {x ∈ R2 | VD(x) = x1 + x2 − I1,2}.
We ﬁrst explore the nature of dynamic management for a general diﬀusion X(t). The
following proposition shows the properties of the value function VD(x) and the stopping
regions Si,D and S1,2,D.
Proposition 3
VM(x) ≤ VD(x), Si,D ⊂ Si, S1 ∩ S2 ⊂ S1,2,D ⊂ S1,2 ∩ S1,2,M
Proof Clearly, VM(x) ≤ VD(x) follows from (19). For any x ∈ S1,D, we have
V1(x1) + V2(x2) ≤ VD(x) = x1 + V2(x2) − I1.
Then, we have V1(x1) ≤ x1 − I1, which implies x1 ∈ S1. Hence, we have S1,D ⊂ S1.









Ex2[e¡rτ(X2(τ) − I1,2 + I1)]







Ex2[e¡rτ(I1 + I2 − I1,2)]
≤ x1 − I1 + x2 − I2 + I1 + I2 − I1,2
= x1 + x2 − I1,2,
where the last inequality implies x ∈ S1,2,D, and, hence, we have S1 ∩ S2 ⊂ S1,2,D. ¤
For x ∈ S1,D ∪ S2,D ∪ S1,2,D, VM(x) agrees with VD(x), while for x / ∈ S1,D ∪ S2,D ∪
S1,2,D VD(x) is strictly larger than VM(x). This gap measures the signiﬁcance of the
dynamic management capability. Note that, although dynamic management may require
higher costs associated with the diﬃculty of the optimal exercise policy when compared
with static management, the model does not assume any extra costs arising in dynamic
management.
We now focus on a case where X(t) follows either a GBM or a BM with a drift to
show detailed properties of dynamic management. Before deriving the results, we need
the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Assume that X(t) follows either a GBM or a BM with a drift.
0 ≤ Vi(x0
i) − Vi(xi) ≤ x0
i − xi (x0
i ≥ xi).
9Proof We can easily check that 0 < dVi(xi)/dxi ≤ 1 holds for all xi. Then, the statement
follows from the mean value theorem. ¤
Using Lemma 1, we can show the following properties of the value function VD(x) and
the stopping regions Si,D and S1,2,D.
Proposition 4 Assume that X(t) follows either a GBM or a BM with a drift.
(Convexity of the value function) VD(x) is a convex function.
(Convexity of the simultaneous exercise region) S1,2,D is a convex set.




(Semi-monotonicity of the individual exercise regions) x ∈ Si,D ⇒ x0 ∈ Si,D (∀x0
i ≥
xi,x0
j = xj (j  = i)).
(Behavior on the indiﬀerence lines) x1+V2(x2)−I1 = x2+V1(x1)−I2 ≥ x1+x2−I1,2
⇒ x / ∈ S1,D ∪ S2,D ∪ S1,2,D. xi + Vj(xj) − Ii = x1 + x2 − I1,2 ≥ xj + Vi(xi) − Ij (j  = i)
⇒ x / ∈ S1,D ∪ S2,D ∪ S1,2,D.
Proof For simplicity, we denote the payoﬀ function of problem (20) by4
f(x) = max{x1 + V2(x2) − I1,x2 + V1(x1) − I2,x1 + x2 − I1,2,0}.
(Convexity of the value function) By the convexity of Vi(xi), the payoﬀ function
f(x) is also convex. Because of the convexity of the payoﬀ function the value function
VD(x) is convex (by Proposition A.6 in (Broadie and Detemple 1997), or equivalently,
Proposition 88 in (Detemple 2006)), when X(t) follows a GBM. Consider X(t) following
a BM with a drift. Similar to the case of a GBM, we can show the convexity of the value
function as follows. For any λ ∈ (0,1),x ∈ R, and y ∈ R, we have
VD(λx + (1 − λ)y) = sup
τ2T
E(0,0)[e¡rτf(λ(x + X(τ)) + (1 − λ)(y + X(τ)))]
≤ sup
τ2T
E(0,0)[e¡rτλf(x + X(τ)) + e¡rτ(1 − λ)f(y + X(τ))] (21)
≤ λsup
τ2T
E(0,0)[e¡rτf(x + X(τ))] + (1 − λ)sup
τ2T
E(0,0)[e¡rτf(y + X(τ))]
= λVD(x) + (1 − λ)VD(y),
where we use the convexity of f(x) in (21).
(Convexity of the simultaneous exercise region) Take any λ ∈ (0,1),x ∈ S1,2,D,
and y ∈ S1,2,D. By the convexity of VD(x), we have
VD(λx + (1 − λ)y) ≤ λVD(x) + (1 − λ)VD(y)
= λ(x1 + x2 − I1,2) + (1 − λ)(y1 + y2 − I1,2)
= λx1 + (1 − λ)y1 + λx2 + (1 − λ)y2 − I1,2,
4For technical reasons we deﬁne f(x) as the nonnegative function. This does not matter because a ﬁrm never
exercises the option which yields a negative payoﬀ.
10where the last inequality implies λx+(1−λ)y ∈ S1,2,D, and, hence, we have the convexity
of the stopping region S1,2,D.
(Monotonicity of the simultaneous exercise region) First, assume that X(t) follows
a GBM. Take any x ∈ S1,2,D, x0















1 − x1)X1(τ) + (x0
2 − x2)X2(τ) + x1X1(τ) + V2(x2X2(τ)) − I1,
(x0
1 − x1)X1(τ) + (x0
2 − x2)X2(τ) + x2X2(τ) + V1(x1X1(τ)) − I2,
(x0
1 − x1)X1(τ) + (x0










E(1,1)[e¡rτ max{x1X1(τ) + V2(x2X2(τ)) − I1,x2X2(τ) + V1(x1X1(τ)) − I2,
x1X1(τ) + x2X2(τ) − I1,2}] (23)
= x0
1 − x1 + x0






where we use Lemma 1 in (22), and the last inequality implies x0 ∈ S1,2,D. Hence, we
have x ∈ S1,2,D ⇒ x0 ∈ S1,2,D (∀x0
1 ≥ x1,∀x0
2 ≥ x2) in the case of a GBM.
Similarly, we can show the monotonicity in the case of a BM with a drift as follows.
For any x ∈ S1,2,D, x0
1 ≥ x1, and x0




1 + X1(τ) + V2(x0
2 + X2(τ)) − I1,
x0
2 + X2(τ) + V1(x0
1 + X1(τ)) − I2,x0
1 + X1(τ) + x0




1 − x1 + x0
2 − x2 + x1 + X1(τ) + V2(x2 + X2(τ)) − I1,
x0
1 − x1 + x0
2 − x2 + x2 + X2(τ) + V1(x1 + X1(τ)) − I2,
x0
1 − x1 + x0










E(0,0)[e¡rτ max{x1 + X1(τ) + V2(x2 + X2(τ)) − I1,
x2 + X2(τ) + V1(x1 + X1(τ)) − I2,x1 + X1(τ) + x2 + X2(τ) − I1,2}] (25)
= x0
1 − x1 + x0






where we use Lemma 1 in (24), and the last inequality implies x0 ∈ S1,2,D.
(Semi-monotonicity of the individual exercise regions) First, consider the case of
a GBM. Take any x ∈ S1,D, x0
1 ≥ x1, and x0
2 = x2. In the same manner as the proof of
11the monotonicity of the simultaneous exercise region, we have
VD(x0) ≤ (23) (26)
= x0




1 + V (x2) − I1,
where the last inequality implies x0 ∈ S1,D. Hence, we have x ∈ S1,D ⇒ x0 ∈ S1,D (∀x0
1 ≥
x1,x0
2 = x2) in the case of a GBM. By the symmetry, we have the semi-monotonicity of
S2,D.
Next, assume that X(t) follows a BM with a drift. Take any x ∈ S1,D, x0
1 ≥ x1,
and x0
2 = x2. In the same manner as the proof of the monotonicity of the simultaneous
exercise region, we have
VD(x0) ≤ (25)
= x0




1 + V (x2) − I1,
where the last inequality implies x0 ∈ S1,D. By the symmetry, we have the semi-
monotonicity of S2,D.
(Behavior on the indiﬀerence lines) Assume that x1+V2(x2)−I1 = x2+V1(x1)−I2 ≥
x1 +x2 −I1,2. Note that x / ∈ S1 ∪S2 because of I1,2 < I1 +I2. By Proposition 3, we have
x / ∈ S1,D ∪ S2,D, which implies
VD(x) > x1 + V2(x2) − I1 = x2 + V1(x1) − I2 ≥ x1 + x2 − I1,2.
Thus, we have x / ∈ S1,D ∪ S2,D ∪ S1,2,D.
Assume that x1 + V2(x2) − I1 = x1 + x2 − I1,2 ≥ x2 + V1(x1) − I2. Note that x / ∈ S2





2 + c2 (x0


























2 − I2) ∈ (−I2,0).
Note that the right-hand side of (27) is the ﬁrst order Taylor approximation to V2(x0
2)
around the point x2. In (27), the equality holds if and only if x0
2 is equal to x2. For any
12t ≥ 0, by (27) we have
VD(x) ≥ Ex[e¡rt max{X1(τ) + c1X2(t) + c2 − I1,X1(t) + X2(t) − I1,2,0}]
≥ e¡rtEx[X1(τ) + c1X2(t) + c2 − I1]
| {z }
!x1+V2(x2)¡I1 (t#0)




In (28), the ﬁrst term → x1+c1x2+x2−I1 = x1+V2(x2)−I1 (t ↓ 0) at a ﬁnite rate while the
second term ↓ 0 (t ↓ 0) at a rate that increases to inﬁnity in the limit. Note that the second
term corresponds to the value of an at-the-money European call option with maturity t.
Therefore, there exists some t > 0 such that (28) is strictly larger than x1 + V2(x2) − I1.
This implies that VD(x) > x1 +V2(x2)−I1 = x1 +x2 −I1,2, i.e., x / ∈ S1,D ∪S2,D ∪S1,2,D.
By the symmetry, we have x2 + V1(x1) − I2 = x1 + x2 − I1,2 ≥ x1 + V2(x2) − I1 ⇒
x / ∈ S1,D ∪ S2,D ∪ S1,2,D. Similarly, using the ﬁrst order Taylor approximation, we can
show that the statement holds for a BM with a drift. ¤
Proposition 4 extends previous ﬁndings by (Geltner, et al 1996, Broadie and Detemple
1997, Bobtcheﬀ and Villeneuve 2005) to a case allowing a convex function Vi(x). Tech-
nically, the proof of the behavior on the indiﬀerence lines has been accomplished in the
same manner as (Nishihara 2010). The monotonicity of S1,2,D leads to the straightfor-
ward prediction that simultaneously increased values of two projects encourage simulta-
neous investment. Although we prove neither the convexity of Si,D nor a property that
x ∈ Si,D ⇒ x0 ∈ Si,D (∀x0
i = xi,x0
j ≤ xj (j  = i)), these properties will be veriﬁed nu-
merically in Section 4. Then, the increased value of either project tends to provide the
incentive for a ﬁrm to undertake the better project individually. The behavior on the
indiﬀerence lines means that a ﬁrm must delay the decision on the investment type when
the two types of investment yield the same value. This is in line with the previous ﬁndings
in the max-options analysis (e.g., (Geltner, et al 1996, Detemple 2006)). By Proposition
2, we can also show the following comparative statics with respect to the correlation
coeﬃcient ρ.
Proposition 5 Assume that X(t) follows a BM with a drift.
(Monotonicity of the value function) VD(x) monotonically increases with ρ.
(Monotonicity of the exercise regions) Si,D and S1,2,D monotonically decrease with
ρ.
Proof The monotonicity of VD(x) immediately follows from Proposition 2. We attach
superscript ρ to VD(x) and S1,D to avoid confusing. For any x ∈ S
ρ
1,D and ρ0 < ρ, we have
V
ρ0
D (x) ≤ V
ρ
D(x) = x1 + V2(x2) − I1,
which implies x ∈ S
ρ0
1,D. Similarly, we can show the monotonicity of S2,D and S1,2,D. ¤
13Note that a decrease in S1,2,D with ρ does not mean a decrease in the possibility
that a ﬁrm chooses simultaneous investment. An increase in VD(x) with ρ results from
an increase in V1,2(x). Then, as in static management (cf. Proposition 2), a ﬁrm tends
to make simultaneous investment in strongly correlated markets. We also make a brief
comment regarding the one-dimensional model by (D´ ecamps, et al 2006). Problem (20) is
similar to that of (D´ ecamps, et al 2006), when X1(t) and X2(t) follow the same dynamics
(which means that ρ = 1) with diﬀerent initial values. In this case, as in (D´ ecamps, et
al 2006), we can derive VM(x) and VD(x) in closed forms, and it can readily demonstrate
that there is no gap between VM(x) and VD(x) for a suﬃciently small x. Accordingly, we
recognize that an imperfect correlation is a source of the gap between static and dynamic
management. This eﬀect can be intuitively explained as follows. As the correlation
becomes weaker, a static choice of the investment type is more likely to result in an
incorrect choice ex post. Then, the gap between static and dynamic management increases
with a weaker correlation. This result implies that managerial ﬂexibility can be a key to
success in market entry into several countries and regions in Asia with wide diversity.
This view will be examined numerically in Section 4.
3.2 Extensions and limitations
This section investigates the robustness of the results in Section 3.1 with respect to changes
in the model assumptions. First, we consider the eﬀects of strategic interactions. Separate
investment may entail a higher risk of rival preemption than simultaneous investment.
This is because the ﬁrst investment induces potential rivals to invest in the remaining
business opportunity. We can incorporate this into our model as follows.5 Assume that
the second investment opportunity for project i is killed at an instantaneous rate λidt,
where a positive constant λi denotes the intensity. Let ˜ Vi(x) denotes the value function




Ex[e¡rτ max{X1(τ) + ˜ V2(X2(τ)) − I1,X2(τ) + ˜ V1(X1(τ)) − I2,
X1(τ) + X2(τ) − I1,2}].
(29)
Clearly, Proposition 3 holds for the killed problem (29). It is also clear that ˜ Vi(x)
monotonically decreases with λi. Then, similar to Proposition 5, we can show a monotonic
decrease in VD(x) and monotonic increases in Si,D and S1,2,D with respect to λi. We can
easily derive ˜ Vi(x) in a closed form when X(t) follows either a GBM or a BM with a
drift. In this case, Propositions 4 and 5 hold for the killed problem (29). Accordingly,
the results in Section 3.2 are relatively robust with respect to consideration of strategic
5Another approach to strategic interactions is the game-theoretic approach (e.g., (Grenadier 1996, Huisman
2001)). For example, (Nishihara 2009) investigates a duopoly real options game concerning two projects.
14interactions. In addition, for X(t) following a nonnegative process, including a GBM, the
value function (29) approaches to V1,2(x) as λi → ∞ (i = 1,2). This means that the
threat of rival preemption provides the incentive for a ﬁrm to undertake both projects
simultaneously.
So far, we assume that I1,2 < I1 + I2 to capture the positive synergy of simultaneous
investment. However, synergy may change not only the costs but also the proﬁts. When
the value of simultaneous investment can be expressed as a linear combination of X1(t)
and X2(t) with positive coeﬃcients, few diﬃculties arise from the technical viewpoint.
Propositions 4 and 5 hold for the case. When there is nonlinear synergy of simultaneous
investment, it is mathematically diﬃcult to show the properties of the value function and
the stopping regions. In such cases, the results depend on parameter values, and we must
calibrate the model carefully.
The eﬀect of learning is another important issue that should be addressed. When a
ﬁrm undertakes projects sequentially, it may beneﬁt in learning from the ﬁrst investment.
From the ﬁrst investment, a ﬁrm may acquire skill, know-how, reputation, etc. If this
is the case, a ﬁrm will make the second investment more eﬃciently. We can capture the
eﬀect by assuming that the second investment requires the sunk costs ˜ Ij, which is lower
than Ij.6 As ˜ Ij decreases, the possibility of individual investment increases. In particular,
when Ii + ˜ Ij (i  = j) decreases below I1,2, the positive synergy of simultaneous investment
is oﬀset by the positive eﬀect of learning in separate investment. In this case, a ﬁrm
always chooses individual investment with the beneﬁt from project ﬂexibility.
In this paper, we consider two projects. One of its natural extensions is to take into
consideration more than two projects. Because the number of combinations of projects
which are undertaken simultaneously increases exponentially with the number of projects,
the formulation and computation of the optimal exercise policy become much more diﬃ-
cult. However, the theoretical results in Propositions 3–5 remain essentially unchanged.
4 Numerical examples
This section reveals further properties of static and dynamic management in numerical
examples. Assume that X(t) follows a GBM. We use base parameter values as follows7:
r = 8%, µ1 = µ2 = 0%, σ1 = σ2 = 20%. (30)
6An alternative modeling for learning is the ﬁltering approach (e.g., (Bernardo and Chowdhry 2002, D´ ecamps,
et al 2005, Shibata 2008)). Extending our model to a ﬁltering model will be a diﬃcult but important challenge
in future work.
7These parameter values are similar to (Geltner, et al 1996, Detemple 2006). We carried out a lot of
computations with varying parameter values and distilled robust results into this section.
15For expositional purposes, we set I1 = I2 = 10, I1,2 = 15. The positive synergy of
simultaneous investment is (20 − 15)/20 = 25%. We can derive Vi(x) in a closed form,
but we must rely on numerical methods to compute V1,2(x),VM(x), and VD(x). We make
a bivariate lattice model8 that approximates to a GBM, and we execute a value function
iteration algorithm to compute V1,2(x),VM(x), and VD(x).
First, we explore the nature of static management. Table 1 shows the option values
Vi(x),V1,2(x),VM(x) = max{V1(x) + V2(x),VM(x)},VD(x) and the investment threshold
x¤
i with varying levels of the correlation coeﬃcient ρ. We set x = (10,10), which is the
same as the sunk cost I1 = I2 = 10 for individual investment. Note that Vi = 16.404
and x¤
i = 1.802 do not depend on ρ. For ρ = −0.5, x = (10,10) lies in the stopping
region S1,2,D, and, hence, V1,2(x) = VM(x) = VD(x) = x1 + x2 − I1,2 = 5 holds. For
other levels of ρ, x = (10,10) lies in S1,2,M \ (S1,D ∩ S2,D ∩ S1,2,D), which means that
V1,2(x) = VM(x) < VD(x). In Table 1, the value of the option to invest simultaneously,
V1,2(x), monotonically increases with ρ. This is because a higher ρ makes X1(t) + X2(t)
more volatile and increases the option value. Figure 1 illustrates the stopping region S1,2
for the basket option. As mentioned in Section 2.2, S1,2 satisﬁes the convexity and the
monotonicity. We see a monotonic decrease in S1,2 with respect to ρ. This is analogous
to the monotonic increase in V1,2(x) with respect to ρ. This monotonicity of V1,2(x) and
S1,2 is the same as the case of a BM with a drift (cf. Proposition 1).
Figure 4 illustrates the simultaneous investment region under static management,
S1,2,M, with varying levels of ρ. The region S1,2,M monotonically decreases with ρ because
of the monotonicity of V1,2(x). Similar to the case of a BM with a drift (cf. Proposition 2),
a ﬁrm is more likely to make simultaneous investment in strongly correlated markets. This
result is consistent with empirical observations. For a large xi, as mentioned in Section
2.3, the boundary of S1,2,M coincides with a line xj = ˆ xj = 5.2729 (j  = i), where ˆ xj is a
unique solution to Vj(xj) = xj−I1,2+Ii. For a large ρ, S1,2,M shows neither monotonicity
nor convexity. As ρ approaches 100%, S1,2,M approaches the region a1 ≤ x1/x2 ≤ a2 for
a small x, where ai is a constant. This is because the proportion of x1 to x2 matters
to a GBM. In contrast, the diﬀerence between x1 and x2 matters to a BM with a drift.
Then, when ρ is very large, S1,2,M is like the region a1 ≤ x1 − x2 ≤ a2 for a small x. The
patterns of static management are revealed ﬁrst by our analysis.
Next, we explore the nature of dynamic management. Figure 3 illustrates the stopping
regions Si,D and S1,2,D for ρ = 0%. For comparison, we plot S1,2,M under static man-
agement. We can check all of the properties in Propositions 3 and 4. The convexity and
monotonicity of Si,D can be also veriﬁed numerically. The continuation region becomes
much smaller as xi increases. Indeed, we see that the continuation region approaches to a
8We make a discretization with 100 time steps per 1 year following a bivariate version of the lattice binomial




















Figure 1: The exercise region for the option to invest simultaneously. This ﬁgure plots S1,2




















Figure 2: The simultaneous investment region under static management. This ﬁgure plots
S1,2,M with varying levels of ρ. The parameter values are set at the base case (30).
17Table 1: The option values.
ρ\ Value x¤
i Vi(xi) V1,2(x) VM(x) VD(x)
−50% 16.404 1.802 5 5 5
−25% 16.404 1.802 5.023 5.023 5.054
0% 16.404 1.802 5.118 5.118 5.15
25% 16.404 1.802 5.239 5.239 5.259
50% 16.404 1.802 5.371 5.371 5.38
line xj = ˆ xj = 5.2729 (j  = i) when xi → ∞. This means that for a large xi, a ﬁrm under-
takes investment in a short time, whether individually or simultaneously, even if the two
types of investment have the same value. This ﬁnding contrasts with that of max-option
analysis (Geltner, et al 1996, Detemple 2006, Nishihara 2010), in which the waiting time
is rather long when two values are equivalent. Figure 4 shows the comparative statics of
Si,D and S1,2,D with respect to ρ. A monotonic decrease in S1,2,D can be seen clearly,
while Si,D is robust with respect to changes in ρ (cf. Proposition 5). This is because
changes in ρ inﬂuence V1,2(x) rather than Vi(x). Table 1 shows that VD(x), like VM(x),
monotonically increases with ρ. This follows from a monotonic increase in V1,2(x) with
respect to ρ.
We proceed with an analysis of a gap between dynamic and static management. Unless
x lies in the stopping regions Si,D and S1,2,D, VD(x) is strictly higher than VM(x). This
gap measures the impact of the managerial ﬂexibility on ﬁrm value. Figures 5 and 6 plot
contour lines of VD(x)/VM(x). Figure 5 shows the comparative statics of VD(x)/VM(x)
with respect to ρ. We see from each panel that VD(x)/VM(x) becomes large on the
boundary of S1,2,M for a small x. This ﬁnding can be interpreted as follows. When the
option values of individual and simultaneous investment are similar, a ﬁrm must wait and
see which type is more eﬃcient. In this case, there is a remarkable advantage to dynamic
corporate management over static management. Otherwise, it does not matter whether a
ﬁrm chooses the investment type statically or dynamically.
From Figure 5, we recognize that VD(x)/VM(x) is rather robust with respect to changes
in ρ. To examine it more accurately, VD(x)/VM(x) tends to be higher when ρ approaches
0%. This is mainly because a weaker correlation increases the possibility that an initial
decision of whether to exercise options individually or simultaneously leads to ineﬃciency
ex post. This result predicts that the dynamic management capability will be a major
success determinant for a ﬁrm’s expansion into Asia’s emerging markets which involve a
variety of risks depending on countries and regions. The gap VD(x)/VM(x) also depends
on r,µi, and σi. For example, Figure 5 shows the comparative statics with respect to
σi. We see that VD(x)/VM(x) decreases with σi. This is because the positive synergy
18of simultaneous investment becomes smaller relative to the option value, which greatly
increases with σi. Similarly, an increase in µ and a decrease in r enhance the option value
and then reduce VD(x)/VM(x).
5 Conclusion
The paper proposed a model for management of multiple real options to ﬁll a great gap
between the project portfolio and real options literature. In particular, we focused on the
problem of whether a ﬁrm should exercise two real options individually or simultaneously.
The model assumes that simultaneous exercise of both options has positive synergy, such
as economies of scale, scope, and networks. The analysis revealed the characteristics of
two styles of management, namely static and dynamic management. A ﬁrm under static
management determines whether it exercises options individually or simultaneously ex
ante, while a ﬁrm under dynamic management makes the choice at the time of exercise.
We veriﬁed the natural intuition that a lower correlation among project values gives a
ﬁrm the incentive to invest individually rather than simultaneously. Further, and more
importantly, we emphasized the signiﬁcance of dynamic corporate management to a ﬁrm
entering weakly correlated markets. The model applies to a ﬁrm’s strategic decision on
business expansion into several countries and regions in Asia. Our results imply that
the heterogeneous dynamics of Asia’s markets across countries and regions increase the
incentive for a ﬁrm to enter each market individually rather than the whole market simul-
taneously. Further, our results imply that the dynamic management capability will be a
major success determinant for a business in Asia.
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